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Continued cooperation, but with reduced scope, efficiency and influence 
…an operational downgrade for law enforcement authorities across the UK … compared to 
what we had before, … though, if you look at it from the parameters of any other third 
country, we have done rather well… .
1
 
Part Three of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA)
2
  – the section dealing with 
criminal justice and security
3
 - indicates a spectrum of continuity/discontinuity in cooperation from 1 
January 2021 onwards.
4
 This reveals both an initial (at least) loss of operational efficiency and a 
diminution of formal British government influence over the strategic development of EU criminal 
justice law, institutions and operational priorities, for example: 
• General continuity: data sharing (biometric and vehicle data via the Prüm 
arrangements and criminal records), PNR screening and confiscation measures.  
• Reduced continuity: the model of extradition based on the European Arrest Warrant 
(EAW), though at the time of writing the practical significant of some detailed 
changes are unclear. 
• Significant loss of continuity: mutual legal assistance in criminal investigations and 
evidence gathering, participation in Europol, Eurojust and joint investigation teams. 
• Significant discontinuity: a loss of the fully automated and integrated flow of 
information from 29 countries
5
 into UK police and border control systems via SIS II. 
EU member states will now need to duplicate all SIS notices onto Interpol 
communication systems. Whatever arrives in the UK by this route will then need to 
be manually uploaded before it becomes accessible for policing the streets or 
controlling entry at the border. 
6
 
• Almost complete discontinuity: mutual enforcement of financial penalties except in 
relation to VAT and welfare benefits.  
Such a legal analysis, however, may not always correspond to operational performance and 
professional influence. For example, the time limits for EU-UK criminal record exchange have 
doubled under the TCA to 20 days. UK law enforcement organisations expect little change from the 
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average pre-2021 transmission time of six days because organisational and technical systems will 
barely change.
 7
 Also, they know the value of professional influence within EU institutions. 
Potential instability  
Successive UK governments struggled to achieve a post-Brexit relationship that might limit the 
economic and constitutional damage but appeared to be consistent with Brexit rhetoric. Continued 
EU-UK criminal justice and security cooperation had also been a priority in their negotiations with 
the EU, particularly access to SIS II operational information and the EAW extradition model. This 
presented additional difficulties. This was chiefly because of the misrepresentation of the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and misplaced hostility to 
international human rights law encouraged earlier by some members those governments.
 8
 
Up to 31 January 2020 the UK was a member state bound by EU internal treaties. By the end of the 
year, it had accepted the status of a third country whose relationship with EU law and institutions is 
regulated (provisionally at the time of writing
9
)  by two international treaties.  The readjustment of 
the EU-UK relationship, however, is far from over. The second treaty, the 1,246-page TCA finalised 
on 24 December provides an overarching politico-legal framework within which the next and 
probably subsequent chapters of Brexit readjustment will be played out. Its authors and signatories 
cannot know (even guess with confidence) when and how the readjustment process will end.  
The last-minute finalisation of the TCA, whether by accident or design, enabled the UK Government 
to avoid considered scrutiny prior to the Westminster Parliament’s approval of the treaty.
10
 During 
the next phase of Brexit readjustment, however, the UK Government will have less control or 
influence over how events unfold. The Commission’s unilateral competency over matters of huge 
economic importance to the UK - regulatory equivalences for financial services, data protection 
adequacy and compliance with EU sanitary and phytosanitary regimes – together with and concerns 
over Northern Ireland/British mainland trade and the far from resolved fisheries questions will 
undoubtedly give rise periodically to political turmoil that could threaten the TCA’s durability. It only 
requires nine months’ notice for the EU or the UK to withdraw unliterally from any aspect of the 
treaty or entirely.  
Criminal justice and security cooperation is potentially even more unstable. If the UK is not granted a 
Commission data adequacy determination or if such a determination is withdrawn, all data sharing - 
under the TCA or other arrangements (e.g., Council of Europe Conventions and bi-lateral treaties) 
between the UK and EU member states would be imperilled. In addition, Part Three cooperation 
may also be terminated should the UK denounce the ECHR or certain of its protocols (chiefly those 
renouncing the use of capital punishment). These two risks are interwoven under EU law.  Data 
adequacy requires a holistic analysis of rule of law compliance, including constitutional and human 
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rights safeguards. Also, as an associated state, UK national security agencies’ compliance with data 
protection principles and human rights now comes within the data adequacy scrutiny process. 
Scope for professional and academic engagement to improve efficiency and perhaps reduce 
instability  
The TCA’s initial limitations and uncertain future means that it is essential for criminal justice 
professionals, including forensic scientists and technologists to help facilitate the successful 
implementation and sequential improvement (envisaged in the treaty) of Part Three cooperation. 
Academics also have a role in explaining the value of such cooperation for justice; and in challenging 
erroneous political views about human rights law and the CJEU. In other words, there are important 
roles for Forensic Science International: Synergy’s authors and readers. 
Detailed rule-making under the TCA needs to be sufficiently dynamic to respond rapidly to fast 
changing criminal activity, especially in cyberspace, by quickly permitting the coordinated 
exploitation of new scientific and technological techniques to counter such threats. In addition, it 
must either be sufficiently flexible to bridge differences in approaches to law or scientific and 
technological standards or, better still, encourage anticipative EU-UK expert collaboration to 
minimise divergence. Fortunately, its governance structure creates opportunities for law 
enforcement officers, prosecutors, forensic scientists and technologists, even for human rights 
lawyers and academics to engage with Part Three rule-making and to influence future cooperation 
strategy: 
• In addition to having a key role in dispute resolution, the Specialised Committee on Law 
Enforcement and Judicial Cooperation (established under the TCA) and its working groups 
will oversee the implantation and future improvement of Part Three cooperation. This type 
of committee and working group structure and way of working will already be very familiar 
to criminal justice professionals who have been involved the implementation of EU 
legislation. The Committee has specific powers and tasks, such as the ability to amend 
deadlines for the scientific and technical evaluations required as the UK widens its 
participation in Prüm data sharing. New responsibilities can be anticipated as EU criminal 
and mutual security law evolve, scientific standards governing biometric data sharing 
improve, and Europol and Eurojust mandates change.  
• The creation of an EU-UK Parliamentary Partnership Assembly is optional under the TCA, but 
transparency of and accountability will be enhanced by mandatory consultation with a joint 
Civil Society Forum about the implementation of the TCA and its extension or revision in 
supplementary agreements. This again should offer considerable scope for professional and 
academic participation and influence. 
The UK will also continue to participate, as an associate member of the European Research Council 
in its €95.5 billion (2021-2027) Horizon Europe research programme and Marie Skodowska-Curie 
Actions.
11
 This will provide opportunities for individuals and institutions to join with EU colleagues in 
initiatives that will directly or indirectly support Part Three implementation and development.  
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